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ELLEN SIEGLERt
INTRODUCTION
I participated in the Duke Law Journal's March 7, 1997 Ad-
ministrative Law Conference on regulatory negotiations to provide
the perspective of a negotiator who represented a trade organiza-
tion in a regulatory negotiation (reg neg). The reg neg in which I
participated was convened by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). I represented the American Petroleum
Institute (API), a trade organization that has been involved in a
variety of processes (including reg negs) through which EPA has
developed, or is developing, regulations.
In this Article, I will describe some of API's experiences in
recent EPA rulemaking processes, principally rulemakings conduct-
ed pursuant to the Clean Air Act.' Then I will present my person-
al views on the advantages and disadvantages of reg negs com-
pared with other rulemaking processes from the viewpoint of an
industry trade association.
I represented API in a reg neg addressing the control of
emission of hazardous air pollutants from equipment leaks at
synthetic organic chemical plants.2 API was invited to participate
in this negotiation because control of equipment leaks at refineries
is in many respects similar to control of equipment leaks at
chemical plants, and API was advised that the negotiated rule for
chemical plants (assuming the negotiations were successful) would
t Senior Attorney, American Petroleum Institute.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994). I described reg negs, based largely on my own
experience with the equipment leaks reg neg, in Ellen Siegler, Regulatory Negotiations: A
Practical Perspective, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,647 (Oct. 1992).
2. The product of these negotiations was incorporated in the EPA's National Emis-
sion Standards for Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants for Equipment Leaks, 40 C.F.R. §§
63.160-.182 (1996).
1429
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
establish a framework that was likely to be used subsequently in a
similar rule for refineries.
The equipment leaks negotiation commenced in 1989 and
produced an agreement on requirements that EPA incorporated
into a final rule on April 22, 1994, pursuant to section 112(d) of
the Clean Air Act. As API had been advised, concepts adopted
in this rule were later included in a similar rule for petroleum
refineries.'
API also participated in a regulatory negotiation EPA con-
vened to develop requirements for the composition of reformu-
lated and oxygenated fuels. The "fuels reg neg" began in 1990
and ended in agreement on a set of principles to guide EPA
rulemaking in August 1991.' I was not directly involved in this
negotiation, but I describe it here in some detail because it is
largely responsible for API's disillusionment with reg negs. API's
experiences in two reg negs and numerous other processes may be
useful to others contemplating participation in a reg neg and seek-
ing to understand the benefits and drawbacks of reg negs from a
participant's standpoint.
I. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY TRADE ASSOCIATIONS IN
THE REG NEG PROCESS
A reg neg is a cumbersome process for everyone involved. It
is particularly complicated for a trade association, however, be-
cause several negotiations are conducted simultaneously during the
reg neg process. At API, decisions on regulatory issues are made
by a committee process; committees are composed of representa-
tives of member companies who, it should be noted, are competi-
3. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Catego-
ries; Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufactur-
ing Industry and Other Processes Subject to the Negotiated Regulation for Equipment
Leaks, 59 Fed. Reg. 19,402 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 63.160-.182 (1996)).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d).
5. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Petroleum Refin-
eries, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,244 (1995) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63, subpt. cc).
6. This negotiation was convened pursuant to sections 211(k) and 211(m) of the
Clean Air Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k), (m).
7. See Agreement Reached on Clean Vehicles Fuels, Environmental News (EPA Press
Release Aug. 16, 1991); Environmental Protection Agency Clean Fuels Advisory Comm.
Outline of Supplemental Proposed Rules and Guidances for Reformulated Gasoline,
Antidumping and Oxygenated Gasoline (Aug. 16, 1991) (both on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
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tors. In all regulatory matters, members negotiate in committees;
they often must then report the results of the negotiations to, and
have them approved by, committees at their respective companies
before they can agree on an API consensus position. This type of
intra-association negotiation is more intense in a reg neg than in a
traditional rulemaking. because member companies realize that if
the reg neg is successful, the trade association will agree to not
litigate if the agency promulgates a rule consistent with the agree-
ment reached! Because the stakes are so high for the industry,
tentative commitments made in a reg neg require a higher level of
ratification.
Negotiations conducted on behalf of a trade association in a
reg neg are also complicated by the frequent need for those rep-
resenting the organization in the reg neg to check back with com-
mittee members before responding to proposals or counter-propos-
als made by others at the reg neg table. While official representa-
tives are given some latitude, there may be significant limits
placed on their ability to negotiate because proposals affect com-
petitors within the trade association differently. Standards that one
company can easily achieve (for example, because the company
has controls already in place as a result of stringent state require-
ments) may be very expensive for another company. In a highly-
competitive industry where profit margins are low, like the petro-
leum refining industry, these differences can significantly impact a
company's fortunes.
A second sphere of negotiations exists when several different
industries are involved in the reg neg. In the equipment leaks reg
neg, the chemical industry and the petroleum industry had to
negotiate on some issues because certain control requirements are
easier to achieve in chemical plants than in refineries. In the fuels
reg neg, there were even greater differences among industry par-
ticipants. For example, refiners sought the greatest amount of
flexibility in fuels requirements; but too much flexibility presented
difficulties for the automobile manufacturers, who would design
engines to use the new fuels.
Finally, of course, the reg neg involves intense negotiations at
the formal reg neg table, at which representatives of state and
8. Such agreements only bind the agency to a proposed rule, not a final rule. How-
ever, if the final rule was consistent with the agreement, the agreement not to litigate
would continue to be effective.
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federal agencies, public interest environmental groups, and perhaps
others, join industry representatives. Building enough trust among
these groups to reach an agreement is a long and difficult under-
taking. The complex and cumbersome nature of the reg neg pro-
cess is one reason why API does not greet with enthusiasm invita-
tions to participate in a reg neg.
II. HISTORY OF THE FUELS REG NEG
The fuels reg neg illustrates many of the difficulties and frus-
trations that can arise when a reg neg process is used to resolve
complex and highly political issues.
Shortly after Congress amended the Clean Air Act in Novem-
ber 1990,1 EPA convened a reg neg to address the Act's new
requirements for reformulated gasoline (RFG).'0 Representatives
from EPA, the Department of Energy, automobile manufacturers,
petroleum refiners and marketers, the oxygenate industry, states,
environmental groups and API participated in the reg neg. Be-
cause the Clean Air Act directed EPA to promulgate the RFG
rules within one year," EPA encouraged participation by advising
potential reg neg participants that the Agency would not have the
time and resources to meet with them individually. For example,
EPA advised API that the reg neg would proceed regardless of
whether or not API participated. Under these circumstances, API
agreed to participate.
The reg neg ended in August 1991 with an agreement on
principles for EPA to follow in the forthcoming RFG rule. The
REG rule was promulgated in two stages: a main RFG rule was
issued on February 16, 1994;"2 a supplemental RFG rule was pro-
mulgated on August 2, 1994.3
9. Act of Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
10. Pursuant to section 211(k) of the amended Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k), EPA
was directed to issue rules to reduce emissions of ozone-forming volatile organic com-
pounds during certain times of the year and to reduce toxic pollutants during the entire
year, through the requirement of reformulation of gasoline in certain ozone non-
attainment areas. A related provision of the Act, section 211(m), see 42 U.S.C. §
7545(m), contemplated state oxygenated gasoline programs for carbon monoxide non-
attainment areas.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(1).
12. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 59 Fed. Reg. 7716 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
13. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Renewable Oxygenate Requirement
1432 [Vol. 46:1429
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
The main RFG rule raised one issue of significance to the reg
neg: nitrogen oxides (NOx). Section 211(k)(2)(A) of the Clean Air
Act provided that emissions of NOx arising from RFG could be
no greater than such emissions from vehicles using "baseline" fu-
els. 4 During the 1991 reg neg, there was some discussion of
whether the "no NOx increase" provision of the statute allowed
de minimis NOx increases. No agreement was reached on this
issue, however. There was no discussion during the reg neg of
NOx reductions.
In February 1993, however, well into the rulemaking and
much to the petroleum industry's surprise, EPA proposed to re-
quire a substantial NOx reduction. The final RFG fuels rule, is-
sued in February 1994, incorporated a somewhat scaled back, but
still substantial, requirement for NOx reduction.' API considered
this requirement a violation of the spirit of the reg neg. API felt
that if EPA had intended to require NOx reductions, the issue
should have been discussed during the reg neg. API chose not to
challenge this requirement in legal proceedings but, in December
1995, API submitted to EPA a petition for reconsideration and
repeal of the RFG NOx standard.' EPA denied the petition on
March 12, 1997.16
In 1994, as a result of political pressure from the ethanol
manufacturers, EPA issued a second rule relating to RFG.'7 This
rule imposed an "ethanol mandate," requiring that thirty percent
of the oxygen in RFG be derived from renewable sources.' EPA
acknowledged that this requirement would benefit manufacturers
of ethanol, the only renewable oxygenate then produced in large
quantities. 9
API regarded the ethanol mandate as a betrayal of the agree-
ment that concluded the fuels reg neg, which was designed not to
favor particular fuel additives. API subsequently challenged the
in Reformulated Gasoline, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,258 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80)
[hereinafter Renewable Oxygenate Requirement].
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(2)(A).
15. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 59 Fed. Reg. 7716, 7753-54 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
16. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Standards for Reformulated Gaso-
line, 62 Fed. Reg. 11,346, 11,360 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
17. See Renewable Oxygenate Requirement, supra note 13, at 39,258, 39,261.
18. See id. at 39,261.
19. See id.
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ethanol mandate.' After first issuing a stay, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated the rule in
April 1995.21 The court held that the ethanol mandate plainly
exceeded EPA's authority under the Clean Air Act.'
In vacating the ethanol mandate, the D.C. Circuit did not
address the issue of whether EPA had violated the reg neg agree-
ment; API did not raise the issue to the court. API attorneys had
cautioned petroleum industry representatives, during and after the
reg neg, that they should not consider the reg neg agreement an
enforceable contract; rather, the attorneys advised that the agree-
ment should be regarded as an unenforceable "gentlemen's
agreement." The recent case of USA Group Loan Services, Inc. v.
Riley,z3 in which the Seventh Circuit addressed in dicta the na-
ture of reg neg agreements, demonstrates that this advice was
appropriate.'
III. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FUELS REG NEG
There can be benefits to participating in a successful reg neg.
First, the opportunity for participants to discuss issues and con-
front each other sometimes leads to a more creative and more
practical regulatory approach than would have occurred in a tradi-
tional rulemaking process, in which parties with different, adverse
positions would participate largely by submitting written comments
on a proposed rule. Second, the consensus process-with its expec-
tation of avoiding litigation over final rule-may persuade the
agency to adopt a more creative legal interpretation than it might
have otherwise adopted for the purpose of reaching a result that
all parties agree makes sense. Third, a successful reg neg can
provide greater certainty than the traditional rulemaking process
that a regulation will not change between agreement and proposal
or between proposal and a final rule. This certainty is extremely
valuable to industry, especially if compliance entails major con-
20. See American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
21. See id.
22. See id. at 1121.
23. 82 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 1996).
24. In USA Group Loan Services, the Seventh Circuit stated that "the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act did not make the promise [to abide by a consensus reached by the
parties] enforceable." Id. at 714. Rather, the Negotiated Rulemaking Act "simply creates
a consultative process in advance of the more formal arms' length procedure of notice
and comment rulemaking." Id. at 715.
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struction projects, which are costly and require years of advance
planning.
The fuels reg neg demonstrates, however, that these benefits
are not always realized even if the reg neg ends in an agreement
among the parties. For example, one of the most important bene-
fits API sought in the fuels reg neg was a degree of certainty that
the informal agreement would be implemented without major
changes sufficient to allow API members to plan to meet Clean
Air Act fuels requirements until at least the year 2000. At the
conclusion of the reg neg, API believed it had achieved this objec-
tive. The events that occurred after completion of the reg
neg-the NOx reduction requirements and the ethanol mandate,
including the ensuing litigation over the ethanol mandate and the
petition for reconsideration regarding the NOx require-
ment-taught API that this benefit can be taken away by an agen-
cy for political or other reasons.
The industry also thought it had secured sufficient leadtime by
reaching a reg neg agreement over three years before the start of
the RFG program. However, the final RFG rule was issued two
and one-half years after the reg neg agreement was signed, leaving
the industry with less than one year to implement the program.
A second lesson is that the costs to participate in a reg neg
are greater for industry than for other participants. This lesson is
not new; API experienced the same phenomenon in the equip-
ment leaks reg neg. The fuels reg neg, however, placed even
greater demands than the equipment leaks reg neg on the petro-
leum industry, and these demands seem even more significant
when they are viewed in the context of the disappearing benefits.
In the context of the fuels reg neg, API was required to satis-
fy certain resource demands. First, API had to educate other par-
ticipants, some of whom had interests adverse to API's, about the
production and distribution of motor vehicle fuels. API found it
necessary to prepare educational materials explaining these mat-
ters, as well as statistical concepts necessary for an understanding
of some of the technical issues involved.' API had no assurance,
of course, that this information would not be used outside the reg
neg. API representatives also continued to divulge information by
25. Conversation with Robert Greco, Staff Member, API, in Washington, D.C. (Mar.
19, 1997).
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answering technical questions about refinery processes and market-
ing practices throughout the negotiation.
A second major resource drain was the need for analysis of
issues and for rapid communication within API. This need in-
volved both staff-level personnel and high-level management rep-
resentatives of API member companies. Because fuels issues are
of great concern to the companies, communication was essential.
A group of about twenty member company executives made them-
selves available to participate in lengthy conference calls every two
weeks for a period of over six months.26
Another related lesson was that environmental group partici-
pants have an advantage at the negotiating table. In the fuels reg
neg, they were not required to educate other participants. Conse-
quently, they did not have to establish their credibility as experts,
as did most industry participants, who-in the fuels reg neg-had
actually been selected because of their technical expertise.
Environmental representatives also enjoyed the advantages of hav-
ing well-developed negotiating skills and experience. In addition,
they did not have to check back with their constituencies at every
turn. State representatives shared some of these advantages with
environmental representatives.
The experience of the fuels reg neg, in short, left API with
the view that the costs of a reg neg can far outweigh its benefits
and that the federal government can too easily find ways to walk
away from a deal.
IV. OTHER RULEMAKING PROCESSES
One should not examine reg negs solely in comparison to a
traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking, in which an agency
first publishes a proposed rule, allows interested persons thirty
days (sometimes more) to comment, and then issues a final rule-
all with little or no discussion among the agency, the regulated
community, and other interested parties. EPA has departed signifi-
cantly from this stereotype of the traditional rulemaking process in
recent years in developing many of its Clean Air Act regulations.
A whole range of processes in which groups of "stakeholders"
may be involved, generally under the requirements of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act,27 has evolved in recent years. Depend-
26. Id
27. Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app.
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ing on the interests involved, the issues to be discussed, and other
various factors, these processes can be preferable to the reg neg
process.
A. Improved Traditional Rulemaking
From API's standpoint, the best approach to rulemaking often
is what might be viewed as an improved version of the traditional
agency notice-and-comment rulemaking process. This process can
be an efficient way to develop a regulation if the regulation is not
of broad applicability and is not particularly controversial.
API has been involved in this "improved traditional
rulemaking" process in connection with a number of Clean Air
Act regulations over the past several years. The process works as
follows. In advance of a regulation's proposal date, API develops
data and analyses, and it recommends and discusses regulatory ap-
proaches with the agency staff in individual meetings. Sometimes
the data used will have been generated jointly by EPA and the
industry. After initial meetings, API may generate additional data,
analyses, and proposals in response to comments and questions
from EPA representatives, who will have performed their own
analyses of the relevant data. This process may continue after a
rule has been proposed and even after promulgation if API has
initiated litigation. The content of any industry-EPA meetings is
recorded in written summaries and is available as part of the
public record.
EPA, API and others have used this procedure effectively in
recent years in three rules EPA has promulgated pursuant to
section 112(d) of the Clean Air Act.' These rules are designed to
restrict emissions of hazardous air pollutants from refineries,29 ma-
rine loading operations, 0 and gasoline distribution facilities.3'
This process involves more uncertainty than does a reg neg.
The agency does not make a commitment that a rule will not
§ 1-15 (1994)).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (1994).
29. See National Emission Standards for Petroleum Refineries, 40 C.F.R. §§
63.640-.654 (1996).
30. See National Emission Standards for Marine Tank Vessel Loading Operations, 40
C.F.R. §§ 63.560-.567 (1996).
31. See National Emission Standards for Gasoline Distribution Facilities (Bulk Gaso-
line Terminals and Pipeline Breakout Stations), 40 C.F.R. §§ 63.420-.429 (1996).
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change significantly before its proposal; changes may be made for
a variety of reasons, such as in response to concerns raised by
other interested parties with EPA staff. There is also a greater
chance that the proposed rule may change between proposal and
promulgation, and a corresponding increased possibility of litiga-
tion. Uncertainty also stems from EPA control over the process it-
self. As in the fuels reg neg, EPA can decline to meet with API
or other interests individually if EPA determines that it lacks
sufficient time and resources. In contrast, once a reg neg has be-
gun, the parties involved have made a commitment to listen to
each other for at least a reasonable period of time.
The improved traditional rulemaking process used to develop
the three Clean Air Act rules mentioned above appears to have
been beneficial to both API and EPA. EPA was able to meet its
deadlines for promulgating rules that will achieve significant reduc-
tions in emissions of hazardous air pollutants. Two of the three
final rules (the petroleum refining rule and the marine vessel load-
ing rule) escaped litigation. API did challenge the third (gasoline
distribution) rule,32 but the litigation was resolved through settle-
ment discussions and minor amendments to the rule.
In March 1995, EPA announced its intention to institute an-
other variation in the traditional rulemaking process for develop-
ing rules pursuant to section 112(d) of the Clean Air Act.3 EPA
was under the pressure of statutory deadlines to issue dozens of
source category 4 regulations pursuant to section 112(d) by the
year 2000 and announced a new "MACT Partnership" pro-
gram. 6 The first phase of the new approach to rulemaking, de-
velopment of a "Presumptive MACT," involved several steps.37
In the first step, known as the Presumptive MACT meeting, EPA
32. See American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, No. 95-1098 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 9,
1995).
33. "MACTI" is an acronym for "maximum achievable control technology," the statu-
tory basis for hazardous air pollutant regulations issued pursuant to the Act. See 42
U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (1994).
34. The regulations apply to those source categories listed pursuant to section 112(c),
see 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1), which requires the EPA to list categories of major sources of
emitters of hazardous air pollutants. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1). Source categories may
relate to specific industries (e.g., petroleum refineries) or to stationary sources used in
many industries (e.g., industrial heaters and boilers). See id.
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
36. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Streamlined Devel-
opment: Announcement and Request for Comments, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,088, 16,089 (1995).
37. See id. at 16,090.
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and state and local agencies would develop a draft presumptive
MACT based on currently available information and technolo-
gy.3 This meeting would be followed by a consultation step, in
which industry and environmental groups would offer comments
on the draft.3 9 Based on this input, EPA, in conjunction with
state and local agencies, would generate a final Presumptive
MACT and choose a path for development of a formal stan-
dard.4' The public would be given opportunities to comment on
this final step of phase one.4'
API, along with others in the industry, had concerns about
the Presumptive MACT process when EPA first instituted it.42
One major concern was that the regulated community would be
excluded from the initial meetings among EPA and the state and
local agencies, which could possibly lead to misunderstandings
about the industry and about available control technologies at a
very early stage in the regulatory process. API believed these
misunderstandings might lead to unnecessary delay and controver-
sy. API also feared that a preliminary MACT determination,
based on incomplete data or analysis, and without technical input
from or review by industry, might be adopted prematurely as a
final state or local requirement by a state or local agency, or even
as a federal requirement if EPA failed to issue a federal rule on
schedule.43 A final concern was that, once a preliminary MACT
was developed, it might be difficult for industry experts to per-
suade EPA that significant changes were needed before a reason-
able and practical proposed rule could issue.
API has had experience with the Presumptive MACT process
in connection with the development of a second rule restricting
hazardous air pollutants from refinery processes, to be issued
pursuant to section 112(d) of the Clean Air Act. This rule, re-
ferred to by the participants as "Refinery MACT II," is expected
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See Letter from Paul Bailey, Director, Health and Environmental Affairs Depart-
ment, API, to Albert H. Wehe, Environmental Engineer, Emission Standards Division,
Office of Air and Radiation, EPA (May 15, 1995) (on file with author).
43. States must develop case-by-case MACT requirements if EPA fails to meet a
promulgation deadline by eighteen months or more. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(j) (1994).
These requirements would be federal requirements.
14391997]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
to be proposed in 1997 and promulgated in 1998. The Refinery
MACT II rule will affect emissions of hazardous air pollutants
from three refinery process vents not addressed in the first refin-
ery MACT rule.' A Presumptive MACT document was complet-
ed and made publicly available for informal comment in 1996,45
and it has served as a useful basis for discussion. It summarized
available data,46 presented some tentative conclusions with respect
to control options,47 and identified a number of issues needing
additional data and further consideration.48
While API retains its general concerns with respect to the
Presumptive MACT process described above, it has been satisfied
with the process in connection with the Refinery MACT II rule.
EPA staff has been available to discuss relevant issues with API
in meetings and conference calls, often with the participation of
state representatives. The Presumptive MACT document does not
appear to have formed the basis of any final requirement of which
API is aware at this time.
As the experiences described above demonstrate, the evolving
traditional rulemaking process can, given the right circumstances,
confer many of the benefits of a reg neg without the disadvantag-
es of a reg neg. API can discuss issues with EPA staff to develop
sound, and even creative, regulatory approaches. EPA remains
free to meet with other interested parties as well, and EPA can
invite some or all interested parties to meet together if it decides
such a meeting would be useful.
B. Formal Stakeholder Processes
The process described above is less useful if EPA is develop-
ing a rule that affects many different interests and parties. In such
circumstances, EPA may decide that individual meetings would be
too time-consuming but that a reg neg may not be the best format
to air and resolve opposing views. EPA may therefore convene a
wide group of interested persons pursuant to the Federal Advisory
44. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 63.640-.654 (1996).
45. See EMISSION STANDARDS Drv., U.S. ENVIL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PRELIMI-
NARY PRESUMPTvE MACr FOR PETROLEUM REFINERY PROCESS VENTS: FCC UNITS,
REFORMERS, AND SULFUR PLANTS (1996).
46. See iL at app. B.
47. See id. at 25-29.
48. See ihL at 30.
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Committee Act,49 in order to identify key issues and, if possible,
to resolve them.
These large group processes tend to share many of the draw-
backs of the reg neg process, such as significant expenditures of
time and resources, often without providing the countervailing
benefit of the resolution of difficult issues. For example, EPA held
several years of meetings of a broad group of interested parties
and of smaller work groups before issuing proposed amendments
to its Clean Air Act New Source Review and Prevention of Signif-
icant Deterioration (NSR) program,0 a complex preconstruction
permitting process that EPA intended to simplify. The proposal
subsequently has been attacked by many commentators5' and ap-
pears likely to be litigated if the final rule bears a close resem-
blance to the proposal.
While the NSR stakeholder process identified areas of dis-
agreement, the process did little to resolve the major issues. One
reason for the relative lack of progress is that the parties were too
far apart on a major portion of the eventual NSR propos-
al-revisions to requirements for protecting federal "Class I" areas
(national parks and wilderness areas). While this portion of the
rule was discussed, it did not appear to industry that there was
much room for compromise. As one industry participant observed:
"On these issues, the meetings were pointless. EPA had made its
mind up that it would do what the federal land managers want-
ed."52 It is not clear that the time and money consumed by the
stakeholder process was well-spent.
Other reasons for the NSR stakeholder process's failure to
achieve significant progress included: the absence of a deadline;
the great number of participants with widely disparate views; and
the complexity of many of the issues involved.
49. See 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 1-15 (1994).
50. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source
Review (NSR), 61 Fed. Reg. 38,250 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51-52) (pro-
posed July 23, 1996).
51. See, e.g., Comments on EPA's New Source Review Proposal, 61 Fed. Reg.
38,250; Air Docket A-90-37 (submitted on behalf of the American Forest and Paper
Association. the American Iron and Steel Institute, the American Petroleum Institute, the
Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, and the National Mining Associa-
tion on Jan. 21, 1997) (on file with author).
52. Interview with William Pedersen, Partner, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge,
in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 28, 1997). Mr. Pedersen was a participant in the NSR stake-
holder process.
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Another stakeholder process in which API has been involved
over the past several years is one that EPA convened in connec-
tion with its "Common Sense Initiative" (CSI) program, which is
part of the Clinton administration's federal government
Reinvention Initiative. 3 CSI groups were formed to address issues
relating to a number of industries, including petroleum refining,
5 4
in an effort to develop "cleaner," "cheaper," "smarter" ways to
ensure environmental progress.55 The petroleum industry CSI
group was composed of representatives of EPA, states, petroleum
refiners, national environmental groups, environmental justice
groups, and labor. 6
The CSI group for the petroleum refining sector was formed
in early 1995."7 The petroleum industry, EPA, and others have
devoted a considerable amount of time, effort, and expense to the
CSI effort. The group has made little progress and, for a time,
appeared likely to be disbanded. Activities have resumed, howev-
er.
Industry participants attribute the lack of progress in the
petroleum refinery sector CSI project to several factors: 1) lack of
a statutory deadline to drive the process forward; 2) lack of a
specific agenda describing the issues the group would address; 3)
too many participants; 4) procedural rules that had the effect of
allowing one or two representatives to veto decisions to which the
majority of the group would have agreed; 5) lack of strong lead-
ership by EPA representatives; and 6) a noticeable feeling of dis-
trust among some of the participants.58
53. See PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON & VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE, REINVENTING
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 15, 50 (1995).
54. See Common Sense Initiative Council Federal Advisory Committee, 59 Fed. Reg.
55,117, 55,117 (1994) (establishment) [hereinafter CSI Council Establishment].
55. Addition of Reporting Elements; Toxic Chemical Release Reporting; Community
Right-to-Know, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,322, 51,326 (1996) (advanced notice of proposed
rulemaking).
56. See CSI Council Establishment, supra note 54, at 55,117.
57. See Common Sense Initiative Oil Refining Sector, Meeting Notice, 60 Fed. Reg.
4619, 4619 (1995) (giving notice of the initial meeting to be held Feb. 9-10, 1995).
58. The observations here are those of API participants in the CSI project, as ex-
pressed in personal and telephone interviews. Interview with Walter McLeod, API Staff
Member, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 21, 1997); Telephone Interview with John Medley,
Coordinator, Environmental, Health and Safety Issues, Mobil Corporation (Mar. 26, 1997);
Telephone Interview with Arthur Lee, Senior Environmental Engineer, Texaco Corpora-
tion (Mar. 27, 1997).
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STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
The NSR and CSI stakeholder processes illustrate that there
are several disadvantages to these other multistakeholder processes
as compared to reg negs: participants do not come to the table
with the same commitment to resolve issues as they would i a
reg neg; the processes are not well-focused; and too many partici-
pants are often involved. As mechanisms to air and identify issues,
stakeholder processes can be effective, but they are not well suited
to issue resolution.
CONCLUSIONS
EPA now uses a variety of rulemaking processes. There is no
single best approach. Reg negs can be effective tools for crafting
creative solutions and providing certainty. These benefits are not
always achieved, however, and reg negs place considerable time
and resource demands on participants. A reg neg is most likely to
be successful if issues and participants are carefully selected. For
example, issues that are highly political are not good reg neg
candidates. Outside factors can also affect the success or failure of
a reg neg. Statutory or consent decree deadlines will make it more
likely that a reg neg will succeed. Trade associations like API are
likely to approach reg negs with skepticism and are most likely to
agree to participate in a reg neg if other options are foreclosed
and EPA exerts pressure for them to participate.
The traditional, notice-and-comment rulemaking process, as it
is evolving at EPA, can offer many of the advantages of a reg neg
and is preferable if EPA staff are agreeable to meeting with dif-
ferent interests individually. Industry can benefit if it generates
information that EPA finds useful and responsive to agency con-
cerns. The apparent certainty of a reg neg is lacking, however, and
the process is entirely under the control of EPA staff.
Overall, however, broad stakeholder processes are difficult to
manage successfully and often have all the drawbacks of a reg neg
with few of the advantages. They are most useful in airing issues
rather than resolving them.
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